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Abstract
We study how mortality reductions and income growth interact, looking at
their relationship prior to the Industrial Revolution, when income per capita was
stagnant. We ﬁrst present a model of individual medical spending giving a ra-
tionale for individual health expenditures even when medicine was not effective
in postponing death. We then explain the rise of effective medicine by a learn-
ing process function of expenditures in health. The rise in effective medicine can
then be linked to the take-off of the eighteenth century through life expectancy
increases, and fostered capital accumulation. The rise of effective medicine has
also an impact on the relation between growth and inequality and on the inter-
generational persistence of differences in income. These channels are operative
through differential mortality induced by medicine effectiveness that turns out to
determines a differential in the propensity to save among income groups.
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In the last centuries, after years of Malthusian stagnation, income per-capita has
shown a remarkably increasing trend. Better material condition and important ad-
vances in medical science have changed the quality and the length of life for millions
of people. A question that naturally emerges, concerns the relation between medi-
cal knowledge and income. The causality between these two variables seems to be
bidirectional: higher income allows higher health expenditures, which contributes to
build medical knowledge; advances in medical knowledge increase longevity which,
modifying the incentives to invest in physical and human capital, has an impact on
the growth rate and on the distribution of income. The link from growth to longevity
is reviewed for example in Fogel (1994) and the subsequent literature. The effect of
longevity on growth is quantitatively assessed by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Li-
candro (2003) and Nicolini (2004) who show that small improvements in adult life
expectancy in the eighteenth century can cause big changes in economic decisions,
leading to an acceleration in income growth.
In order to disentangle the causation links between medicine and income, it is en-
lightening to look at the period prior to the Industrial Revolution, when income was
stagnant but medical knowledge improving.
From the available data for England, discussed in details in section 2, we can decom-
pose the evolution of medical knowledge and of life expectancy into three periods.
Before the seventeenth century the effectiveness of medicine was very low. Truly
speaking, medicine was probably not effective at all. Given its low effectiveness of
medical services, doctors hardly managed to increase the life expectancy of their pa-
tients. As a consequence, differential mortality between the rich adult who can afford
the services of a doctor and the common was very low, or even non existent: income
was of little importance in determining life expectancy. Next comes a time where
medicine becomes more effective. The rich is the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from these improve-
ments, and their life expectancy rose, as it is witnessed in the study of British peerage
families carried over by Hollingsworth (1977) on the basis of genealogical data. Dif-
ferential mortality starts increasing, because the improvements in longevity still do
not beneﬁt to the whole population. In the third period there is a global improvement
in health. Medicine become more and more effective, and the advantage of upper
classes in terms of longevity is partially made up. Differential mortality decreases.
1In this paper we ﬁrst build a model of medical spending that is suitable to be ap-
plied in a period, like pre-industrial Europe, where medicine effectiveness was very
low. In this framework we give a rationale for individual health expenditures even
when medicine was not effective in postponing death. Then we combine this result
with a simple learning process based on health expenditures to model the rise of
effective medicine: the continuous demand for health services allow to accumulate
knowledge, paving the way for advances in medical science. We show that these
ingredients are sufﬁcient to build a consistent explanation of the path of differential
mortality in England that we have presented above.
Then we use our model economy to look at the implications of the evolution of med-
ical science on income. In particular we discuss the effect on the growth rate and we
also study how differential mortality, inducing a differential in the propensity to save
and bequeath across income groups, plays a role in shaping the path of inequality
and of the relationship between inequality and growth.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 1 we present a brief review
of the literature linking health and growth. In Section 2 we show mortality data per
social class in order to assess the role of income in shaping health. We also provide
a brief discussion and some references concerning the evolution of medical science.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 focuses on the solution to the household
optimization problem. Section 5 is devoted to the study of dynamic properties of the
model. Finally Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
1 Literature Review
The study of the relations between longevity and economic variables is receiving a
growing attention. In particular it isﬁnding speciﬁc applications in developmenteco-
nomics and in the literature that, following the contribution of Galor and Weil (1999)
and Galor and Weil (2000), aims to explain the take off of European economies during
the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries after years of Malthusian stagnation. A
general and informal discussion on the possible links between health (and in particu-
lar life expectancy) and economic variables is for example presented in Sala-I-Martin
(2002).
More speciﬁcally de la Croix and Licandro (1999) explore the possibility that exoge-
nous improvements in longevity have positive effects on education decisions. Anal-
2ogous ideas have been used by Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2003) and
Nicolini (2004) to shed light on the historically observed relation between rising life
expectancy and acceleration of growth in the period before the industrial revolution.
The effects of an exogenous reduction of mortality on growth are also proved to be
shaped by social security systems, in a framework where fertility decisions are en-
dogenous and parents face a trade-off between the quality and the quantity of their
children (Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2001)).
Not only life expectancy has an impact on economic variables and in particular on
growth; the opposite is also true. For these reasons other authors endogenize life
expectancy to study the bidirectional link between longevity and growth. Morand
(2002) argues that investment in health plays a crucial role in the transition from a
growth regime fueled by physical capital to a sustained growth regime fueled by hu-
man capital. In Chakraborty (2004) low income and high mortality reinforce each
other, making possible the existence of poverty traps. A similar result is found in
Cervellati and Sunde (2005) and it is used to model an endogenous transition from
a long period of stagnant growth to a period of sustained growth through a process
that can be interpreted as industrial revolution. Kalemli-Ozcan (2002), Blackburn
and Cipriani (2002) and Lagerloef (2003) combine endogenous life expectancy and
endogenous fertility decisions with the purpose to give a complete account of the in-
terrelation between demographic and economic variables. Finally Castello-Climent
and Domenech (2004) and Chakraborty and Das (2005) show that the endogenous
determination of life expectancy could signiﬁcantly affect the intergenerational trans-
mission of inequality, contributing to explain the persistent disparities between indi-
vidual wealth or income levels.
Usually growth models that endogenize life expectancy relate either directly or in-
directly life expectancy to medical knowledge. A direct link can be established by
the explicit introduction of investment in health. An indirect link is often modeled
linking life expectancy to human capital. This is also true for those models (for ex-
ample Morand (2002), Cervellati and Sunde (2005), Lagerloef (2003)) that are more
directly involved in the explanation of the take off European economies during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: life expectancy increase as a consequence of an
higher investment in health (in Morand (2002)) or an higher level of human capi-
tal, that could be interpreted as higher medical knowledge (in Cervellati and Sunde
(2005) and Lagerloef (2003)). Galor and Moav (2005) develop a complementary the-
ory (that does not rely on the role of medical technology) of the time path of life
expectancy over time in the 10,000 years between the Agricultural Revolution in the
3Neolithic period and the Industrial Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century.
The theory relies on the idea that mortality risk associated with environmental fac-
tors rose in the transition from hunter-gatherer tribes to sedentary agricultural com-
munity and ultimately to urban societies, triggering a process of natural selection
that ﬁnally produce a population with an higher genetic potential for longer life ex-
pectancy.
However to the best of our knowledge, though many aspects of the relation between
longevity, growth and inequality have been explored in the literature, no paper fo-
cuses on the speciﬁc role of the effectiveness of medical science, explaining its evolu-
tion and the related implications for growth and inequality.
2 Income and Mortality in Pre-Modern Europe
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd data on mortality rate or life expectancy by income groups for
the pre-industrial period. We gather here some evidence for England as a whole,
combining sources from Hollingsworth (1977) and Wrigley et al. (1997), and for two
cities from continental Europe, based on surveys by Perrenoud (1975) and Bardet
(1983).
Starting with England, we compare in Figure 1 life expectancy at birth of the average
person (from parish reconstitution, seeWrigleyetal.(1997))with theone oftheBritish
aristocracy (from genealogical data, see Hollingsworth (1977)). Before 1700, there is
not much differences in adult mortality across social classes. Surprisingly the elites
have lower life expectancy; this unexpected result is attributed by Johansson (1999)
to an urban penalty paid by the aristocracy for the pleasures and opportunities of city
life. The quasi-egalitarian mortality regime began to change by 1700. Life expectancy
rose for all groups but faster and further for the elite.
Two other data sets can give further hints on mortality per social class before the In-
dustrial Revolution. They cover the population of two cities in Continental Europe,
Geneva (Perrenoud 1975) and Rouen (Bardet 1983). Age speciﬁc survival probabili-
ties are presented in Table 1 for three social classes. In both data sets, infant mortality
rates are much lower in the elite groups. This reﬂects the better living conditions of
this group. We also ﬁnd that in Geneva (XVIII century) and in Rouen (XVIII century)
there is not much differences in adult mortality across social classes. In Rouen, there
is no difference in the survival probabilities from age 15 to age 30 and from age 30 to




























































































































Table 1: Survival rates in Geneva and Rouen
social Survival probabilities
class 0→15 15→30 30→45
Geneva workers 0.34 0.80 0.70
XVII merchants 0.45 0.84 0.74
notables 0.61 0.89 0.81
Rouen workers 0.33 0.85 0.87
XVIII merchants 0.49 0.87 0.86
notables 0.47 0.86 0.84
5age 45 of notables and simple workers. This is in line with the English data presented
above. In Geneva, the upper social class has a slight advantage.
The determinants of the evolution of life expectancy during the the past centuries
have been lively discussed in medical history and mortality history. One of the issue
concerns the role of medical science.
Siraisi (1990) provides a survey of medical learning and practice in Europe between
1100 and 1500. There was little to distinguish from one healer to one another in terms
of effectiveness, with the possible exception of surgeons. The techniques employed
and the general agreement on what they could or could not achieved remained re-
markably stable over the period. Lindemann (1999) covers the period 1500-1800 and
shows how ancient ideas persisted well into the eighteenth century.
The weakness of ancient medicine was well known by the consumers of the seven-
teenth century. According to Porter (1995), critics denied that medicine as taught in
the universities did much good. The pompous physician, spouting Greek aphorisms,
was an easy satirical target; and the experiences of decimating waves of epidemics
did nothing to enhance doctors reputation. Popular proverbs endorsed this distrust:
one doctor makes work for another.
As a consequence some authors claim that the rise of life expectancy in early modern
Europe relied more on changes in immunology and/or improvement in the climate
than on human factors (like medical advances). Johansson (1999) argues against the
traditional therapeutic nihilism - that tend to denies any effectiveness of medicine
before the end of the nineteenth century - and suggested an increase of medicine
effectiveness as a possible explanation for the change, documented in Figure 1, from
an egalitarian mortality regime to a regime characterized by mortality differential
between rich and poor people. Indeed in the period 1500-1800, medicine showed an
increasing experimental attitude. Though no improvement was done on the ground
of the disease theory (which was still mainly based on traditional ideas), signiﬁcant
advances based on practice and empirical observations were done.
Many valuable observations on diseases were made before 1800 but was not accom-
panied by systematic research programs, as described in Porter (1996). For exam-
ple, Dobson demonstrated in 1776 that the sweetness of urine in diabetes was due to
sugar; Lettsom published in 1786 a detailed account on alcoholism; Beddoes and oth-
ers conducted investigations into tuberculosis. But no decisive breakthroughs came
from disease theory.
6The effectiveness of the treatment of some important diseases was improved thanks
to the discovery of new drugs coming from the new world: ipecacuanha was used for
severe dysentery, guaiacum for Syphilis, and the bark of the cinchona tree for Ague
(malaria). Advancesin the treatment of Syphilis were also done due to improvements
in the development of condoms. Citrus fruits started to be used in the prevention
and in the treatment of scurvy. All these drugs allowed to make advances. The un-
derstanding of how drugs works only came progressively in the nineteenth century,
with the development of chemistry (Weatherall 1996).
Finally Table 2, which shows the number of books containing lifestyle advice written
in the period 1600 − 1800 by sub-periods, provides some indirect evidence of the
fact that lifestyle advices (regarding for example personal and domestic cleanliness)
became popular 1. These new medical advances, mainly due to their high cost, were
available for a long period only to rich people.
In the eighteenth century bubonic plague also disappeared from England. However
the reasons of this disappearance of the bubonic plague are still lively debated and
some authors explain it in exogenous terms. In any case, independently of this de-
bate, it could be noticed that a ”warning system” was developed by the seventeenth
century in London. Weekly bills of mortality, containing the cause of death, were
published: when the number of plague deaths reached a worrying value, foreshad-
owing the outbreak of the epidemic, people having enough money to move leaved
the city. This system, though not effective in the treatment of the plague itself, can
be interpreted as a public health measure, that had an impact on the health of rich
people.
As suggested by Johansson (1999) the cumulative effects of the above described im-
provements could have determined a net efﬁcacy of medicine in the eighteenth cen-
tury. “As early as 1829 Dr.F.B. Hawkins wrote a book entitled Elements of medical
statistics, in which lie described what could be called an early modern epidemiolog-
ical transition. Several centuries before his own time leprosy, plague, sweating sick-
ness, ague, typhus, smallpox, syphilis and scurvy had been leading causes of death.
Now all of these diseases had disappeared, could be cured, or treated effectively. At
the present scarlet fever, consumption, gout, dropsy, palsy, apoplexy (including heart
attacks and strokes), mania, and diseases of the brain were the most prevalent causes
of death. The last six of the eight diseases listed were not contagious; they were
1We are aware that, to draw conclusions about the increasing diffusion of lifestyle advices, it would
be better to look at the ratios between medical books and the total number of books. However, to the
best of our knowledge, data about the total number of book written in the period are not available
7chronic diseases most likely to strike older adults”(Johansson (1999), pag. 48)
Table 2: Titles in health in England, 1600-1800









We conclude this section with an important remark. In the remaining part of this
paper we focus on the role of medicine (as in the analysis of the evidence presented
above, we use this term in a broad meaning, including also lifestyle advices). This
does not mean that the increase in the level of life expectancy can be explained relying
only on advances in medical science. Many factors may have contributed to the re-
duction in mortality since the eighteenth century (nutrition, medicine, immunology)
and attributing a speciﬁc weight to each of them is very difﬁcult (Fogel 2004). The
reason for which we restrict our analysis to medicine effectiveness is that the focus of
the paper is more on the differences in the increase of life expectancy between the rich
and the poor than on the evolution of the level of life expectancy in absolute terms.
Among the factors that may have affected life expectancy in early modern Europe,
access to health care seems to be particularly relevant for explaining this differential
mortality between social classes.
3 A Model of Medical Spending
The model is set up in discrete time, with time going from 0 to inﬁnity. In each period
one physical good is produced using labor, capital and land. All households are
endowed with one unit of labor. The total supply of land is ﬁxed and it is normalized
to 1. We assume as initial condition that the ownership of land is equally distributed
among some households (called ”landlords” or ”aristocrats” that we will denote with
the index”L”)andthat other households (called ”commons” that we will denote with
the index ”W”) do not have any property right on land. Moreover we also assume
8for simplicity that there is no market for land and, as a consequence, this ownership
structure perpetuates over time. In this sense we have in the economy two social
classes or groups. The size Ni of the newborn generation in each population group is
assumed constant over time (any other stationary dynamic process for the population
would qualitatively give the same result, without adding any crucial element).
Households can live for two periods, adulthood and old-age. They are alive with cer-
tainty during the ﬁrst period and at the end of adulthood, they die with a probability
β(hi
t) which depends on their health status hi
t.
Individual budget constraints
In the ﬁrst period of life, agents receive a bequest bi
t from their parents and obtain
income from land and/or labor:
yL
t = bL
t + wt + ρtxt (1)
yW
t = bW
t + wt (2)
where yi
t denotes income, ρt is the return from holding one unit of land, xt = 1/NL is
the amount of land per person of group L, and wt is the wage per person that is the
same for both groups.
Income ﬁnances consumption ci
t, investment in health di
t and savings si
t. If an agent
survives in the second period he do not consume and he uses his savings to ﬁnance



















Here we do not assume the existence of a perfect annuities market. If an agent dies
before entering in the old-age his resources (i.e. Rt+1si
t) pass on to his offspring. As a
consequence we have in any case that the bequest received by an agent at the begin-
ning of its adulthood does not depend on the survival of his father.
Medicine as an experience good
9We distinguish the stock of health hi
t from the investment in health di
t. The reason
is that in the model the health status is determined by health expenditure, but in a
non deterministic way: indeed we explicitly take into account that medical treatment
may turn bad, in particular if medicine is inefﬁcient. More precisely, we assume that,
when allocating an amount di
t of resources to health expenditures, the household can
reach a high level of health h+(di
t) with probability pt, and a worsened level of health
h−(di







t) = 1+ v(di
t) with probability pt
h−(di
t) = 1− v(di





The idea underling this formulation is that a) medical expenditures can be good or
bad for health and b) each agent is not able to know the quality of medical cares
before having experienced them, but he only knows the probability pt that can be
interpreted as a measure of the effectiveness of medicine.
The possibility that medicine could harm patients could seem at a ﬁrst glance strange
given today’s standards, but it has been always recognized by physicians. One of the
most basic precepts all medical students - also nowadays- are taught is
primum non nocere
(First of all, do not harm!): this aphorism is meant to remind that there is a possibility
for any medical intervention to damage patients.2. When building economic models
of the demand of modern health services, it is considered reasonable for analytical
simplicity to omit this feature of medical treatments, since one may think that the
probability of medicine to damage the health of its patients is very low.3 However
when analyzing the demand of medical services in pre-modern Europe, we think
that it is crucial to explicitly take into account the potential damage that this medical
2This aphorism is usually considered a Latin paraphrase by Galen of an Hippocratic aphorism, but
it seems more plausible to attribute it to the English physician Thomas Sydenham (1624-1689) (for an
history of this aphorism and a discussion of its applicability as an ethical guide for modern medicine
see Smith (2005).)
3However saying that this probability is perhaps negligible from an economic point of view, does
not mean that it can be disregardedfrom the concrete point of view of medical science and its patients.
In medical literature the problem of adverse reactions to drugs is for example widely discussed.
10services might cause: a theory that abstract from this feature of health expenditure
should be considered of difﬁcult applicability in a period where the development of
medicine and its effectiveness were very far from the present levels.
The other assumption implicit in(6)isthat medicineisan experiencegood, i.e. people
do not know the quality of medical services before having bought them Once again
this is also true nowadays and it was even more true in the past4.
We stress that by using these assumptions we put ourselves in the worst position for
justifying our theory of the rise of effective medicine, which relies on the learning by
spending mechanism described later on. Indeed if we use a standard formulation in
which medicine is always a good it is easy to explain why the demand of medical
services was positive in early modern Europe. This explanation is much less obvious
under our formulation that allows the probability of medicine to damage patients to
be equal to 1/2.
Preferences








which is increasing in the three arguments.
Health affects the utility through two channels: itinﬂuencesthe probability to survive
in the old-age and it has a direct effect on the utility function when old. Assuming
time separability, U(ci
t,b,hi






where u and ˜ u are well-behaved increasing instantaneous utility functions.
The survival probability β(hi
t) takes the following form:
β(h+(di
t)) = β + f(di
t) (8)
β(h−(di
t)) = β − f(di
t) (9)
where f′(.) > 0, f(0) = 0 and f(∞) ≤ β ≤ 1 − f(∞). From (6) we have that the
survival probability is determined by (8) and (9) respectively with probability pt and
1 − pt.
4For a description of the uncertainty a consumer faced in the selection of a good medical service
and of the way medical technology diffused among households see Mokyr (1993)






























t, pt) ≡ β + f(di
t)v(di
t) + (2pt − 1)(f(di
t) + βv(di
t))
Notice that this utility function is formally similar to the one of Chakraborty and
Das (2005); the difference is that in our case the function φ(d, p) is not a survival
probability: it is a more complex expression that depends on the survival probability
(and thus on the probability pt) and on the utility of health and is derived from our
previous assumptions.
Medical technology
The probability pt of getting beneﬁts from medicine depends on the current state of
medical knowledge:
pt = G(Mt) (12)
where Mt is the stock of medical knowledge available at period t. We assume that




2 if Mt < ¯ M
1
2 + g(Mt) if Mt ≥ ¯ M
(13)
where g(Mt) > 0 and g′(Mt) > 0.
The stock of medical knowledge Mt accumulates with expenditures in health:
Mt = (1 − δ)Mt−1 + Dt (14)




and δ is the depreciation rate of the stock of medical knowledge, possibly zero.
The view behind the above formulation is that medical knowledge evolves through
12a learning process based on experiments with treatments. Learning is thus related to
the amount of medical expenditures. Moreover while standard model of learning by
doing (explaining improvements in labor productivity) are continuous, we assume in
(13) a threshold effect. This assumption depends on the speciﬁc nature of science and
reﬂects the fact that ”physicians slowly learned how to learn from empirical observa-
tions”. The idea is that it took many observations (and thus time) before the impor-
tance of observations themselves was fully understood and more effective methods
for drawing conclusions from experience were developed. As we have already said
in section 2, it was only after the seventeenth century that medicine started to rely on
systematic and organized methods of observation 5.
We remark that in our model, there is no exogenous technical progress, neither in
the medical sector nor in the ﬁnal good sector. However this does not mean that
we do not believe that there cannot be improvements in medical knowledge without
experimentation (after all, fundamental research may play a role) but it implies that
our results do not rely on the presence of such exogenous trends.
Final good technology
The ﬁnal good is produced from a technology combining land, labor and capital. We
assume that capital fully depreciates after one period. The production function is of
the AK type, and includes a positive externality of the aggregate stock of physical






with A denoting total factor productivity, Lt labor input, Kt capital input, and Xt land.
The proﬁts of the representative ﬁrm are given by
Yt − wtLt − RtKt − ρtXt
The equilibrium
Given an initial stock of medical knowledge M0, an initial stock of capital K0, and an
initial asset distribution (sW
−1,sL
−1) such that K0 = NWsW
−1 + NLsL
−1, an equilibrium is
5In particular two english personages played an important role: the philosopher Francis Bacon
(1561-1626) (who is very well known for his theory of induction and wrote ”The historie of life and
death with observations naturall and experimentall for the prolonging of life”) and the physician
Thomas Sydenhan (1642-1689)(who is known as the ”father of clinical medicine”).



















• a vector of factor input maximizing proﬁts




t − wtLt − RtKt − ρtXt
• a vector of medical effectiveness (pt) and medical knowledge (Mt) satisfying
(12), (13) and
Mt = (1 − δ)Mt−1 + NLdL
t + NWdW
t
• a vector of prices (wt, Rt,ρt) such that all markets clears




Xt = 1, (17)
• an aggregate stock of capital ¯ Kt = Kt.
4 The consumer problem
In this section we study the solution to consumer optimization problem. We ﬁrst
propose analytical results under some simplifying assumptions. In a second step
we study the sensitivity of these results in a more general case, through numerical
experiments. A speciﬁc objective is to prove that, though medicine is not effective in
the sense that p = 1/2, people with a sufﬁciently high income level have an incentive
to invest in health. To alleviate notation, we abstract for time and class indexes in this
section.
144.1 A simpliﬁed model
We consider a simple version of the model in which we assume that there is no ﬁrst
period consumption; this implies that the only arbitrage is between leaving bequest












where we assume τ ≤ β ≤ 1 − τ to have a well deﬁned life expectancy. Indeed this
condition is necessary and sufﬁcient to have, according to (8) and (9), 0 ≤ β(h(d)) ≤ 1
when d tends to inﬁnity.




















d, b ≥ 0 (21)


















We deﬁne the set of optimal levels of d as:
D⋆ = D⋆(y, p) =
 
d : d = argmaxd∈[0,y]W(d,y, p)
 
.
D⋆ is not empty since W(d,y, p) is a continuous function and [0,y] is a closed and
bounded set. An element of D⋆ is denoted by d⋆ = d⋆(y, p) . In general D⋆ could
contain interior solutions (i.e. d⋆ ∈ (0,y)), corner solutions (i.e. d⋆ = 0 or d⋆ = y), or
both.






















(1 + d)2 + (2p − 1)(β + τ)
d
1 + d
   (23)
We deﬁne:
Γ(d,y, p) ≡ Wd(d,y, p) (24)
and list its main properties:
P1 Γ(d,y, p) is continuous in its three arguments.













In particular we have that: if p > 1/2 and y is sufﬁciently high then Γ(0,y, p) >
0; if p = 1/2 then Γ(0,y, p) < 0.
P3 When d = y we have
Γ(y,y, p) = Γ(d,d, p) = −∞ (26)
P4 The effect of income is given by:
Γy(d,y, p) > 0 (27)
P5 The value Γ(d,y, p) when y goes to ∞ depends on the value of p and on the fact
that d = 0 or d ∈ (0,y):
Γ(d,∞, p) = ∞ ∀ d ∈ [0,y) if p > 1/2
Γ(d,∞, p) = ∞ ∀ d ∈ (0,y) if p = 1/2
Γ(0,∞, p) = 0 if p = 1/2
(28)
P6
Γp(d,y, p) > 0 for d ≤ d⋆(y, p) (29)
See Appendix A for the proof.
16We notice that P3 implies d⋆  = y: leaving nothing for bequest is never optimal; as
a consequence d⋆ ∈ [0,y). We now prove in Proposition 1 that the solutions can be
corner (d⋆ = 0) or interior (d⋆ ∈ (0,y)) depending on the value of y. For this purpose
we deﬁne the minimum income such that we can have an interior maximum:
ˆ y = ˆ y(p) =
min{y > 0 : ∃ at least one d ∈ (0,y) such that W(d,y, p) −W(0,y, p) ≥ 0}
(30)
Proposition 1
(i) ˆ y(p) is ﬁnite ∀p.
(ii) ∀y > ˆ y(p) we have d⋆ ∈ (0,y), i.e. the optimal choices of d are all interior.
(iii) ∀y < ˆ y(p) we have d⋆ = 0, i.e. d = 0 is the unique optimal choice.
Proof
(i) A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a d⋆ = 0 is
W(d,y, p) − W(0,y, p) =
  d
0
Γ(s,y, p)ds ≤ 0
∀ d ∈ (0,y). According to P5, when income tends to inﬁnity, Γ(s,y, p) is ≥ 0 for s = 0
and it tends to inﬁnite for s > 0. By continuity P1, this also holds true when income
is ﬁnite but large enough. Hence, W(d,y, p) − W(0,y, p) is positive for a ﬁnite large
enough income.
(ii) From deﬁnition (30) we know that W(d, ˆ y, p) − W(0, ˆ y, p) =
  d
0 Γ(s, ˆ y, p)ds ≥ 0
for at least one d ∈ (0,y). From P4 we know that Γy(s, ˆ y, p) > 0. Thus if y > ˆ y then
W(d,y, p) −W(0, ˆ y, p) > 0, implying that d = 0 is not an optimal choice.
(iii) It follows directly from the deﬁnition (30). ￿
Proposition 1 implies that people with a sufﬁciently high level of income invest in
health also when medicine is not effective, i.e. p = 1/2. This is our ﬁrst result and it
is the basic ingredient of our explanation of the rise of effective medicine.
To understand the idea behind Proposition 1, we can start with the simple remark
that d⋆ is chosen comparing the cost of health investment (represented by the fore-
gone amount of bequest), with its gain. This comparison is obviously affected by the
income level. What could seem less obvious is the fact that the gain of investing in
health is positive when p = 1/2. The intuition is the following. Consumers that in-
vest in health face two possible states of the world: medicine could be a good or a
bad. However, since the health status has an impact both on life expectancy and on
17the quality of life of the second period, they do not assign to these states of the world
the same utility. The expected utility of investing in health is given by the sum of the
two following expressions:
pβu(b)v(d) + pf(d)u(b) + pf(d)u(b)v(d) (31)
−(1 − p)βu(b)v(d) − (1 − p)f(d)u(b) + (1 − p)f(d)u(b)v(d) (32)
where (31) is p times the utility derived from investing in health when medicine is
a good and 32 is 1 − p times the disutility derived from investing in health when
medicine is a bad. The ﬁrst term in each expression is the quality of life effect (ap-
plied to the life expectancy computed without investment in health). The second
term is the life expectancy effect (evaluated with the utility of second period com-
puted without investment in health). The third one is cross effect, i.e. the positive
(or negative) quality of life effect applied to the increase (or the reduction) in life ex-
pectancy. The ﬁrst two terms may be positive or negative, depending of the fact that
medicine is good or bad. However, the third term is always positive: if medicine is
good it represents an increase in the number of years during which a better life effect
is enjoyed; if medicine is bad, it represents a reduction in the number of years during
which a low quality of life effect is experienced. It is clear that, due to presence of the
cross effect, (31) is greater than (32) even when p = 1/2.
Given d⋆, the optimal level of bequest b⋆ is determined using the budget constraint
(20). As a consequence we have that b⋆ ∈ (0, Ry] and in particular: ∀y ≥ ˆ y(p) we
have b⋆ ∈ (0, Ry), whereas ∀y < ˆ y(p) we have b⋆ = Ry.
We now study the effects on d⋆ of changes in y and prove that health expenditure is a
normal good.
Proposition 2
For y ≥ ˆ y(p), d⋆ is strictly increasing in y.
Proof
The proof is a simple application of supemodularity to our one-dimensional choice
problem (see Edlin and Shannon (1998)). Let us consider d⋆
1 = d⋆(y1, p). If y1 in-
creases to y2 then d⋆
2 = d⋆(y2, p) cannot be below d⋆
1. Indeed , by deﬁnition of d⋆
1
and d⋆
2, we always have W(d⋆
1,y1, p) ≥ W(d⋆
2,y1, p) and W(d⋆
1,y2, p) ≤ W(d⋆
2,y2, p)
18and as a consequence W(d⋆
1,y2, p) − W(d⋆
1,y1, p) ≤ W(d⋆
2,y2, p) − W(d⋆
2,y1, p) (i.e.
the effect of y on W(d,y, p) is higher at d⋆
2 than at d⋆
1). If d⋆
1 ≥ d⋆
2 the last inequality




1,y1, p) = 0 for the ﬁrst order condition, P4 also implies that
Wd(d⋆
1,y2, p) > 0 and thus we can conclude that d⋆
1 < d⋆
2. ￿
Then we focus on the behaviorof the propensity to save when y changes. Thepropen-











(i) If y < ˆ y(p) then s⋆
y = 1.






Using Proposition (1), we have that if y < ˆ y(p) then s⋆
y = 1 and if y ≥ ˆ y(p) then
s⋆
y < 1.
Then we deﬁne x = d⋆/y and write the ﬁrst order condition of the optimization















d⋆ β + τ
d⋆




By Proposition 2, d⋆ is an increasing function of income y. When y → ∞, d⋆ goes
either to some limit ¯ d < ∞, or to +∞. If it goes to ¯ d, x goes to zero and s⋆/y goes to 1.
If d⋆ goes to +∞ equation (34) becomes
2p(β + τ)x = 0
which implies x = 0 and s⋆/y = 1. ￿
Proposition 3 establishes that the relation between propensity to save and income has
a U-shape: very rich people and poor people has an higher propensity to save than
people with an average income.
We ﬁnally analyze the effects of changes in p, which is a measure of medicine effec-
tiveness.
19Proposition 4
(i) For y ≥ ˆ y(p):
d⋆ is strictly increasing in p
b⋆ and s⋆/y are strictly decreasing in p.
(ii) ˆ y(p) is strictly decreasing in p.
Proof See Appendix B. ￿
According to Proposition (4) an increase in medicine effectiveness has a positive im-
pact on investment in health and a negative one on bequests and propensity to save
out of income. Moreover the threshold level above which people start investing in
health decreases. This means that poor agents that do not invest in health when
medicine is not efﬁcient, may decide to invest in health once medicine effectiveness
increases.
Asweexplaininthe nextsection, Proposition 3andpart(i)of4turn out tobedifferent
in the general model where ﬁrst period consumption is present.
4.2 The model with ﬁrst period consumption
In the simpliﬁed model of Section 4.1, we prove a result that is crucial for the way in
which we model the rise of effective medicine: people with a sufﬁciently high income
invest in medicine also when medicine is not effective (i.e. p = 1/2). However
there are two properties of the model of the previous section that are undesirable.
Firstly, the propensity to save is not monotonically increasing in income. Secondly,
better medicine will increase the propensity to save only by reducing the share of
health expenditures on income. These two properties are a direct consequence of
having abstracted from ﬁrst period consumption. Indeed, in such a case, savings are
negatively related to health expenditures through the budget constraint (20). This is
no longer true if ﬁrst period consumption is introduced, since the relation between
savings and health expenditures turns out to depend on ﬁrst period consumption
through the budget constraint (3).
This last consideration and more generally the need to assess the robustness of the
results derived in the previous section, motivate the inclusion of ﬁrst period con-
sumption. We perform such a task by way of numerical simulations.
20With regard to the utility of bequests u(b) and to the effect of health investment on
the health status v(d) and on the survival probability f(d), we keep assumption (18).
The functional form for utility of ﬁrst period consumption is the same as the one of
bequests: u(c) =
√
c/2. Thus agents maximize the following utility function with
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where we have used the budget constraints (5) to express the ﬁrst period consump-
tion c as a function of b and d. Finally for the numerical simulation of this section we
put β = 0.25, τ = 0.1 (this is the parametrization that we use in the simulation of the
model that we perform in Section 5) and R = 1.
Figure 2 displays ˆ y(p). It is clear that ˆ y(p) exists and is ﬁnite for all level of p and
in particular for p = 1/2 (the intuition of this result is provided in the previous
section). Moreover ˆ y(p) turns out to be decreasing with p. Thus Proposition 1 and
Proposition4 (ii) still hold true.
Simulations also show that investment in health increases in income and thus Propo-
sition 2 is robust to the inclusion of ﬁrst period consumption. Moreover bequests and
ﬁrst period consumption turn out to be normal goods too.
Then we look at the share of health expenditures on income and at the propensity
to save and to consume. Figure 3 shows d⋆/y and s⋆/y as a function of y. c⋆/y is
in Figure 4 . The behavior of d⋆/y is similar to the one of Section 4.1: the share of
health expenditures on income is zero for people with an income below ˆ y(p), and
then it follows an inverse U-shape. However this ﬁgure for d⋆/y does not imply a
behavior of b⋆/y analogous to the one of the previous section. Indeed the propensity
to save turns out to be a constant below 1 for income levels up to ˆ y(p) and then it is
increasing. This is due to the fact that c⋆/y decreases for y > ˆ y(p). The intuition can
be understood, taking into account that d⋆ positively depends on y and that a higher
d⋆ induces agents to increase the weight they put on the utility of the second period.
The fact that the propensity to save turns out to be increasing with income has two
important implications. First it introduces a mechanism of intergenerational trans-
mission of inequality: rich people devote to bequests a larger fraction of their income
than poor people. Secondly it determines a positive relation between growth and in-
21Figure 2: ˆ y(p)
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Figure 3: Health spending and savings income shares
d⋆/y, s⋆/y









Figure 4: Consumption income shares
c⋆/y










22Figure 5: Effects of an increase in medicine effectiveness
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23equality: the higher is the share of income distributed to the rich, the higher is the
the total amount of saving in the economy. This kind of relationship between growth
and inequality is an assumption which is sometimes made in the growth literature for
which we have proposed here a foundation based on the role of medicine. Such an
assumption can be found in Galor and Moav (2004) who present a general discussion
of all the possible channels through which inequality and growth could be related.
Finally in Figure 5 we display the effect of an increase in medicine effectiveness (i.e.
a change from p to p′ > p) on d⋆/y, s⋆/y and c⋆/y . For income levels below y(p′),
this effect is nought. For income levels above y(p′) and contrary to what is claimed
in Proposition 4, both the share of health expenditure on income and the propensity
to save increase in response to an increase in medicine effectiveness. Once again this
is now possible since a rise in p causes c⋆/y to drop for y > y(p′).
5 Dynamics
In the previous sections we present the buildingblocks of our model economy andwe
discuss in details the features of the individual optimization problem. In this section
we discuss the dynamic implications of the results derived above.
Our aim is twofold. First we show that the model we have constructed is a consistent
explanation of the empirical evidence on life expectancy presented in Fig. 1. Then we
look at the implication of the model for growth, inequality and the relation between
them. For this purpose it is crucial to study the behavior over time of the propensity
to save. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the propensity to save of at least one of the two
classes implies an increase in aggregate savings and as a consequence an increase in
the growth rate of income. Moreover, as explained in the previous section, the higher
is the propensity to save of the rich compared to the one of the poor, the higher is
inequality and the stronger is the positive relation between inequality and growth.
For these purposes, we use a numerical simulation of the model. We do not have the
ambition to calibrate our two-period overlapping generation model to actual data.
We only give a numerical example of the dynamics generated by the model. We
keep the same assumption on the utility function of section 4.2 (β = 0.25, τ = 0.1).
One period is 30 years. The values for the parameters of the production function
are: A00.525, α = 1/3, θ = 1/10. As far as the evolution of medical knowledge is
concerned, we initially want p = 1/2 and thus, according to (14), we need to choose
24M0 < ¯ M. In particular we put M0 = 0, ¯ M = 15 and δ = 0.12. For the function g(Mt)
we choose the following speciﬁcation: 0.3 Mt/10
1+Mt/10. Thus g′(Mt) > 0, g′′(Mt) < 0 and
limMt→∞ g(Mt) = 0.3. Finally we set the initial condition for the income of the two
social classes: in period zero the income of the landlord is assumed to be higher than
ˆ y(1/2), while the income of the commons is ﬁxed below ˆ y(1/2).
Panels A and B of Figure 6 show the evolution over time of the propensity to save
and of life expectancy for the landlords and the commons. The behavior of inequality
(deﬁned here as the ratio between the income of the landlords and the income of the
commons) and of the growth rate of aggregate income are in panel C and D.
Looking at these ﬁgures we can distinguish three phases.
In the ﬁrst phase medicine isineffective (i.e. p = 1/2) and has noeffect in terms of life
expectancy. Only the landlords invest in health. As a consequence their propensity
to save is slightly higher than the one of the commons.
According to (14), medical experimental knowledge accumulate. At one point, medi-
cal experimentations are numerous enough to generate an improvement in medicine
effectiveness. A second phase starts. The landlords goes on investing in health, while
the commons still choose to not buy medical services. Life expectancy increases
for the landlords and mortality differential widens. Stimulated by longer lives, the
propensity to save of landlords strongly increases over time. This boosts the growth
rate of income and inequality. Moreover the positive relation between inequality and
growth is strengthened.
Thanks to growth in capital, and thanks to the increase in medicine effectiveness, the
income of the commons reaches the threshold above which they also start to invest
in health. In this third phase their life expectancy increases. Medical knowledge,
stimulated by the growth in health expenditures, progresses rapidly. Asymptotically,
the life expectancy of the poor catches up the one of the rich and they converge to
a constant value. The propensity to save of the two groups follows the same path.
As a consequence inequality decreases over time and the positive relation between
growth and inequality disappears. In the long run, the growth rate of income tends
to its balanced growth value.
¿From the simulation above we can draw two main conclusions, concerning the im-
plication foreconomicvariablesofourmodeleconomy. First, theevolution ofmedicine
effectiveness may have contributed in England to the acceleration in the growth rate
during the eighteenth century. Moreover it may also have played an important role
25Figure 6: Example of dynamics
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26in shaping the evolution of inequality and of the relation between inequality and
growth. They both follow an inverted U. Initially, when the development process
starts, inequality increases and the positive relation between inequality and growth
is strong. Then, when there is a further increase in output, there is a trend towards a
more equal distribution of income and the positive relation between inequality and
growth disappears. This relation between the level of development and inequality
qualitatively resembles the well known Kuznets’ curve, for which our framework
provides a theoretical justiﬁcation 6. As far as the empirical evidence is concerned,
the existence of the Kuznets curve in England between the eighteenth and the nine-
teenth century seems to be corroborated by the evidence on income distribution (see
Lindert (2000)) 7.
6 Conclusion
As discussed in section 1 many aspects of the relation between longevity, growth and
inequality have been explored in the literature. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no paper formally discuss the speciﬁc role played by the evolution of the effec-
tiveness of medical science, which has been viewed by some historians (see section 2
) as an important factor for understanding the evolution of life expectancy in England
between the eighteenth and the nineteenth century.
Our ﬁrst contribution in this paper is to build a model of medical spending that is
suitable to be applied in a period, like pre-industrial Europe, where medicine effec-
tiveness was very low. For this purpose we model medicine as an experience good:
medicine can be a good with probability pt and a bad with probability 1 − pt, and
agents simply knows this probability distribution.
We give a rationale for individual health spending even when pt = 1/2, i.e. when
medicine was on average not effective. Combining this result with a simple learning
process based on health expenditures, we are able to give a consistent explanation of
the path of life expectancy in England for the different income groups: initially there
are no difference in life expectancy of the rich and of the poor; then life expectancy
6For other explanations of the Kuznets curve see for example Acemoglou and Robinson (2002) and
the reference therein
7However, given the limited reliability of available data, some caveats have to be added. Indeed to
best guess the evolution of income inequality, the available information on income distribution should
be also integrated with the analysis of movements in factor-price ratios and in inequality of wealth
and of earnings (see Lindert (2000))
27of the rich increases while life expectancy of the poor remains stagnant; ﬁnally life
expectancy of the poor starts increasing and it catches up the one of the rich.
Then we use our model economy to look at the implication for economic variables.
First the rise of effective medicine, producing an increase in life expectancy and thus
in savings, positively affects the growth rate of income. Secondly we show that the
evolution over time of medicaleffectiveness plays a role in shaping inequalityand the
strength of the relation between inequality and growth; inequality follows the same
inverted U shape as the differential in mortality between the rich and the poor.
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A Proof of Property P6




















Γp(d,y, p) > 0 ⇔ 2(y − d) − d(1 + d) > 0 (37)
30Using the ﬁrst order condition derived from (23), inequality (37) at d = d⋆ can be
written as:
Γp(d⋆,y, p) > 0 ⇔
β + τ d⋆2
(1+d⋆)2 + (2p − 1)(β + τ) d⋆
1+d⋆
τ 2d⋆
(1+d⋆)3 + (2p − 1)(β + τ) 1
(1+d⋆)2
− d⋆(1 + d⋆) > 0
⇔ [β − τ]d2 + 2βd + β > 0
(38)
which always holds true since we have assumed β ≥ τ. Moreover from (36) we see
that Γp(d,y, p) is decreasing in d. Thus we can conclude that Γp(d,y, p) > 0 ∀d < d⋆.
B Proof of Proposition 4
(i)Theproofissimilartothe oneusedinProposition 2. Letusconsider d⋆
1 = d⋆(y, p1).
If p1 increases to p2, then d⋆
2 = d⋆(y, p2) cannot be below d⋆
1. Indeed, by deﬁnition of
d⋆
1 and d⋆
2, we always haveW(d⋆
1,y, p1) ≥ W(d⋆
2,y, p1) andW(d⋆
1,y, p2) ≤ W(d⋆
2,y, p2)
and as a consequence W(d⋆
1,y, p2) − W(d⋆
1,y, p1) ≤ W(d⋆
2,y, p2) − W(d⋆
2,y, p1) (i.e.
the effect of p on W(d,y, p) is higher at d⋆
2 than at d⋆
1). If d⋆
1 ≥ d⋆
2 the last inequality





1,y, p1) = 0 for the ﬁrst order condition, P6 also implies that
Wd(d⋆
1,y, p2) > 0 and thus d⋆
1 < d⋆
2. Finally using the budget constraint (20) and
equation (33), we can also determine how b⋆ and s⋆
y react to a change in p.
(ii) By deﬁnition (30), W(d, ˆ y(p), p) −W(0, ˆ y(p), p) ≥ 0 for at least one d ∈ (0,y).
Using (22) to compute:

















we can notice that W(d,y, p) −W(0,y, p) is strictly increasing in y and p.
Thus if p increases to p′ then W(d, ˆ y(p), p′) − W(0, ˆ y(p), p′) > 0. Since W(d,y, p)
is continuous in y can choose y < ˆ y(p) and have W(d,y, p′) − W(0,y, p′) ≥ 0. As
consequence, we can conclude that ˆ y(p′) < ˆ y(p).
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